

The Anti-Terrorist Policy



Of The British Wadokai Karate-do Federation

英国和道会空手道連盟 - 本部道場

Valid until 1st January 2011

*Working closely with the Special Branch and
Devon & Cornwall Constabulary Recommendations*

FEDERATION PRESIDENT
& CHIEF INSTRUCTOR
Gary E Swift (7th Dan) Kyoshi

The British Wadokai is a Full-Member of the
British Wado Federation

Definition

Counter-terrorism (also spelled counterterrorism) is the practice/s, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt in response to terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and imputed.

The tactic of terrorism is available to insurgents and governments. Not all insurgents use terror as a tactic, and some choose not to use it because other tactics work better for them in a particular context. Individuals, such as Timothy McVeigh, may also engage in terrorist acts such as the Oklahoma City bombing.

If the terrorism is part of a broader insurgency, counter-terrorism may also form a part of a counter-insurgency doctrine, but political, economic, and other measures may focus more on the insurgency than the specific acts of terror. Foreign internal defence (FID) is a term used by several countries for programs either to suppress insurgency, or reduce the conditions under which insurgency could develop.

Counter-terrorism includes both the detection of potential acts and the response to related events.

Building a counter-terrorism plan involves all segments of a society or many government agencies. In dealing with foreign terrorists, the lead responsibility is usually at the national level. Because propaganda and indoctrination lie at the core of terrorism, understanding their profile and functions increases the ability to counter terrorism more effectively.

See the series of articles beginning with intelligence cycle management, and, in particular, intelligence analysis. HUMINT presents techniques of describing the social networks that make up terrorist groups. Also relevant are the motivations of the individual terrorist and the structure of cell systems used by recent non-national terrorist groups.

Most counter-terrorism strategies involve an increase in standard police and domestic intelligence. The central activities are traditional: interception of communications, and the tracing of persons. New technology has, however, expanded the range of military and law enforcement operations.

Domestic intelligence is often directed at specific groups, defined on the basis of origin or religion, which is a source of political controversy. Mass surveillance of an entire population raises objections on civil liberties grounds.

To select the effective action when terrorism appears to be more of an isolated event, the appropriate government organisations need to understand the source, motivation, methods of preparation, and tactics of terrorist groups. Good intelligence is at the heart of such preparation, as well as political and social understanding of any grievances that might be solved. Ideally, one gets information from inside the group, a very difficult challenge for HUMINT because operational terrorist cells are often small, with all members known to one another, perhaps even related.

Counterintelligence is a great challenge with the security of cell-based systems, since the ideal, but nearly impossible, goal is to obtain a clandestine source within the cell. Financial tracking can play a role, as can communications intercept, but both of these approaches need to be balanced against legitimate expectations of privacy.

Legal Contexts

Anti-Terrorism Legislation

In response to the growing threat of international terrorism many countries have introduced anti-terrorism legislation.

United Kingdom

- The United Kingdom has had anti-terrorism legislation in place for more than thirty years. The Prevention of Violence Act 1939 was brought in response to an Irish Republican Army (IRA) campaign of violence under the S-Plan. This act had been allowed to expire in 1953 and was repealed in 1973 to be replaced by the Prevention

of Terrorism Act a response to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. From 1974 to 1989 the temporary provisions of the act annually.

- In 2000 the Acts were replaced with the more permanent Terrorism Act 2000, which contained many of their powers, and then the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.
- During The Troubles, authorities in Northern Ireland were accused of employing a shoot-to-kill policy
- The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was formally introduced into the Parliament November 19, 2001 two months after the September 11, 2001 attacks in America. It received royal assent and went into force on December 13, 2001. On December 16, 2004 the Law Lords ruled that Part 4 was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, but under the terms of the Human Rights Act 1998 it remained in force. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was drafted to answer the Law Lords ruling and the Terrorism Act 2006 creates new offences related to terrorism, and amends existing ones. The Act was drafted in the aftermath of the 7 July 2005 London bombings, and like its predecessors some of its terms have proven to be highly controversial.
- Great Britain dealt with internal threats from terrorism through a secret law enforcement training program known as Operation Kratos.

Counter-Terrorism and British Wadokai

The British Wadokai Karate-do Federation aims, by working in partnership with other agencies, to bring about a better awareness and understanding of issues of risk within the Dojo of Terrorism and Terrorist Training.

As part of this aim the BWK is committed to the prevention and detection of this type of crime by being aware and communicating with the relevant authorities trained in handling terrorist threat.

It is commonly known, amongst various departments of Police Special Branch, that various terrorist 'cells' have emerged over time. The sole aims of these cells are to cause as much damage, disruption and fear throughout the country as possible. Additionally, learning combat skills are paramount in the advantage of creating a better combatant in any conflict.

Do You Really Know Who Are Teaching?

Martial-arts, *as we all know*, is potentially the most efficient and effective way of maiming and even killing someone without a weapon. So, additionally, this could be an advantage to all types of unscrupulous people for numerous reasons. Terrorist Cells, Murderers, Rapists, and basically any unlawful or unsavoury character that wishes to learn, and use these killing skills, for the sheer potential they possess.

All instructors must be aware, and responsible, for making sure they have the right person standing in front of them when they are teaching these techniques. What sort of vetting processes can we use? Other than our instincts and the most basic questions asked on our Licence Application Forms, we would actually know very little about our students at first.

However, what we have got, which is probably our first inclination that something may not be quite right, is our 'Zanshin' - 'environmental & elemental awareness'. And our Zanshin can be heightened as we talk to our prospective students. Very often many students come through contacts or people that we already know, can we trust these contacts? In my situation, *and probably as with most of us*, our contacts are always through this procedure and the already established Martial-arts direction in the first place. The majority of students are juniors, and the parents are always the first point of contact, so *hopefully* not much risk there. Adults approaching us straight from the street are probably the most vulnerable, as far as *our* vulnerability is concerned. However, again with conversation and continual training, we can normally 'suss out' the misfits and they are usually shown the Dojo exit door at the earliest

signals. However, most people who aren't suited usually leave anyway, as the skills require many years of dedicated practise, *and some more*, to perfect - martial-arts can be, and is, a lifetime of study.

Thankfully, especially with our pre-start 'on the spot' vetting and checks, we have not had any concerns in the past - *but we can't rest on our laurels*. Terrorists may still find ways to infiltrate our Dojo in all sorts of guises and tactics, so this is what we must all be aware of. Accents and colour of skin could be a first sign, but remember, many terrorists have actually come from (*and were born in*) our own country (sleepers). Accents can be changed, and pleasantries can disguise true intentions. But if we are all aware, and work together, we can help to eradicate this possible threat to our own Dojo as well as our society and lives. Everyone must be aware... Parents, students, instructors alike must all have a thought for those around and that train alongside us.

With the continual threat of terrorism, both home and abroad, the Government and Security Services have all reminded us to be extra vigilant. *This all very well and good, but what are we actually looking for?*

When we first induct students onto the path of martial-arts we have always gone through the process of elimination. For example, some of the things we consider are:

- Will this student make it, or even continue after his first grade?
- Does the student have any medical conditions we need to be aware of?
- Does he possess aggressive or violent tendencies?

This process of determining what sort of student we are considering, to take in as a member of our club, is something that has gone on since martial-arts first established itself in this country. So, realistically speaking, we have already set ourselves up as a 'vetting officer'. All we need to do is to extend those protocols into the mindset of a terrorist.

- Does this student come from our usual enquiry base?
- Is there anything unusual about his/her demeanour?
- Is there anything unusual about his/her enrolment enquiry?
- Are they being evasive or secretive when being asked enrolment questions?
- Is the payment unusual or suspicious?
- Have they come in groups of the same or similar origin?
- Where are their origins?
- Are they making unusual requests for specialist training?
- Are they making unusual requests for weapons training?

If you have any concerns about any people who are in your Dojo, *or someone suspicious who has approached you to join your club*, then there is somewhere to contact.



Special Branch with Devon & Cornwall Constabulary

The Anti-Terrorist Hotline: 0800-789321.

Non Urgent:

Email; terrorism@devonandcornwall.pnn.police.uk

Telephone; 01392-452683.

The poster included below is what was issued by the Devon & Cornwall Police Special Branch. If you wish an original, if you haven't already received a copy, please contact the BWK Administration and you will be sent a copy. Please make sure that this is in full view on one of your poster-boards for all to see. Additionally, if you haven't yet received this poster, please contact us as soon as possible.

Know your customer!

- Do they come from your usual customer base?
- Is there anything unusual about their enrolment or enquiry?
- Are they being evasive/secretive?
- Is the payment unusual/suspicious?

If you notice anything that you suspect may be connected with terrorist activity... don't hesitate...

Call the Anti-Terrorist Hotline on 0800 789321

If non urgent please contact us on terrorism@devonandcornwall.pnn.police.uk or call 01392 452683

Building safer communities together

DEVON & CORNWALL CONSTABULARY

Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Further Information.

About the Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The aim of the UK Government's counter-terrorism strategy is to reduce the risk we face from international terrorism so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

Our revised strategy

The terrorist threat and the risks we face are always changing.

The revised strategy:

- Provides a context for this work by describing the recent history of the international terrorist threat.
- Sets out the key underlying causes that create and sustain terrorism: areas of unresolved conflict in the world and failed and fragile states where terrorism can thrive; terrorists' use of new technology; the ideology behind violent extremism and the process of radicalisation that convinces some people to support or carry out terrorist acts.
- Develops new action to stop the source of terrorist recruits by preventing people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. This work draws on a new and deeper understanding of how individuals become radicalised.

- Creates comprehensive programmes of action here and overseas to tackle both the symptoms and the causes of terrorism.
- Indicates how new resources and techniques will be used to disrupt terrorist operations planned against this country and prosecute those responsible.
- Ensures action in the UK is thoroughly coordinated with our work internationally, so it has maximum impact in countering the terrorist threat.
- Strengthens our protection of terrorist targets, including transport and essential services.
- Includes new work to counter the threat of attack using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear devices.
- Involves a wider range of people and resources than ever before, ensuring we are all working together to counter the threat.

Rights and Freedoms.

The principles and values that form the very basis of our society are at the core of our counter-terrorism strategy.

Terrorism threatens some of our most fundamental rights, including the most important human right of all – the right to life.

Protecting the lives of the British people is our most important job. The aim of our strategy is to allow people to live normally, free from fear.

We put respect for human rights at the centre of our response to the terrorist threat and we go to great lengths to ensure our response is proportionate, fair, and effective. Where necessary, to ensure this, we have put in place robust, independently monitored safeguards and checks.

Responding to a Terrorist Incident.

In a terrorist attack, the government works closely with local authorities and police to respond.

Our national response to a terrorist incident can be most simply defined as a combination of responses on a national level (where the strategic work is done) and on a local level (where the boots hit the ground, and the hands-on work takes place).

The government, police and emergency services all work in tandem when an attack occurs. Police are hands-on, taking the operational lead on the ground, with vast and wide-ranging support from a number of governmental departments and agencies.

The National Response.

Most emergencies in the United Kingdom are managed at a local level by the emergency services and by local authorities, however the response to acts of terrorism will always be overseen on a national level.

The management of terrorist incidents is led by the Home Secretary as minister responsible for counter-terrorism across England, Wales and Scotland.

Separate arrangements exist for dealing with terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland, where the Northern Ireland Office will take the lead.

Responding to an Incident.

The response to any terrorist incident relies upon a coordinated approach.

- If the police suspect they may be dealing with a terrorist incident they will immediately notify the Home Office. Once it has been agreed that the Chief Constable needs government support to deal with the incident, all key government players are then notified and a decision is made on whether to convene the government's crisis committee.
- The Home Office leads and coordinates the response from the crisis committee, which is chaired as required by a senior official or minister. The committee assumes

strategic control of the incident, and draws upon the resources of other government departments, including the security and intelligence agencies, the police, military, scientific and other specialist advice, local authorities and the emergency services.

- In order to establish an effective link between the crisis committee and the police command centre at the scene, a government liaison team (GLT) is immediately deployed to act as a single point of contact.
- The GLT is headed by a government liaison officer (GLO), and will support the police commander on a 24/7 basis for its duration, reporting back regularly to the crisis committee to ensure that all decisions are based on accurate and up-to-date information and take into account both operational and political implications.
- A key consideration in the response to any incident concerns the need for regular public information updates via the media, and where necessary specific instructions issued by the government or police, where the public may be directly affected by an incident.

These plans are regularly tested and reviewed, and updated in the light of changing domestic or international circumstances with lessons learnt incorporated into

future contingency planning.

Added Information.

Terrorism and Human Rights

One of the primary difficulties of implementing effective counter-terrorist measures is the waning of civil liberties and individual privacy that such measures often entail, both for citizens of, and for those detained by states attempting to combat terror. At times, measures designed to tighten security have been seen as abuses of power or even violations of human rights.

Examples of these problems can include prolonged, incommunicado detention without judicial review; risk of subjecting to torture during the transfer, return and extradition of people between or within countries; and the adoption of security measures that restrain the rights or freedoms of citizens and breach principles of non-discrimination. Examples include:

- In November 2003 Malaysia passed new counter-terrorism laws that were widely criticised by local human rights groups for being vague and overbroad. Critics claim that the laws put the basic rights of free expression, association, and assembly at risk. Malaysia persisted in holding around 100 alleged militants without trial, including five Malaysian students detained for alleged terrorist activity while studying in Karachi, Pakistan.
- In November 2003 a Canadian-Syrian national, Maher Arar, alleged publicly that he had been tortured in a Syrian prison after being handed over to the Syrian authorities by U.S.
- In December 2003 Colombia's congress approved legislation that would give the military the power to arrest, tap telephones and carry out searches without warrants or any previous judicial order.
- Images of unpopular treatment of detainees in US custody in Iraq and other locations have encouraged international scrutiny of US operations in the war on terror.
- Hundreds of foreign nationals remain in prolonged indefinite detention without charge or trial in Guantánamo Bay, despite international and US constitutional standards some groups believe outlaw such practices.
- Hundreds of people suspected of connections with the Taliban or al Qa'eda remain in long-term detention in Pakistan or in US-controlled centers in Afghanistan.
- China has used the "war on terror" to justify its policies in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region to stifle Uighur identity.

- In Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Yemen and other countries, scores of people have been arrested and arbitrarily detained in connection with suspected terrorist acts or links to opposition armed groups.
- Until 2005 eleven men remained in high security detention in the UK under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.

Many would argue that such violations exacerbate rather than counter the terrorist threat. Human rights advocates argue for the crucial role of human rights protection as an intrinsic part to fight against terrorism. This suggests, as proponents of human security have long argued, that respecting human rights may indeed help us to incur security. Amnesty International included a section on confronting terrorism in the recommendations in the Madrid Agenda arising from the Madrid Summit on Democracy and Terrorism (Madrid 8–11 March 2005):

"Democratic principles and values are essential tools in the fight against terrorism. Any successful strategy for dealing with terrorism requires terrorists to be isolated. Consequently, the preference must be to treat terrorism as criminal acts to be handled through existing systems of law enforcement and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. We recommend: (1) taking effective measures to make impunity impossible either for acts of terrorism or for the abuse of human rights in counter-terrorism measures. (2) the incorporation of human rights laws in all anti-terrorism programmes and policies of national governments as well as international bodies."

While international efforts to combat terrorism have focused on the need to enhance cooperation between states, proponents of human rights (as well as human security) have suggested that more effort needs to be given to the effective inclusion of human rights protection as a crucial element in that cooperation. They argue that international human rights obligations do not stop at borders and a failure to respect human rights in one state may undermine its effectiveness in the international effort to cooperate to combat terrorism.

Strategies:

Pre-Emptive Neutralisation

Some countries see pre-emptive attacks as a legitimate strategy. This includes capturing, killing, or disabling suspected terrorists before they can mount an attack. Israel, the United States, and Russia have taken this approach, while Western European states generally do not.

Another major method of pre-emptive neutralisation is interrogation of known or suspected terrorists to obtain information about specific plots, targets, the identity of other terrorists, whether or not the interrogation subjects himself is guilty of terrorist involvement. Sometimes more extreme methods are used to increase suggestibility, such as sleep deprivation or drugs. Such methods may lead captives to offer false information in an attempt to stop the treatment, or due to the confusion brought on by it. These methods are not tolerated by European powers. In 1978 the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the Ireland v United Kingdom case that such methods amounted to a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment, and that such practices were in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 3 (art. 3).

Non-Military Preventive Actions

The human security paradigm outlines a non-military approach which aims to address the enduring underlying inequalities which fuel terrorist activity. Causal factors need to be delineated and measures implemented which allow equal access to resources and sustainability for all people. Such activities empower citizens providing 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'.

This can take many forms including the provision of clean drinking water, education, vaccination programs, provision of food and shelter and protection from violence, military or otherwise. Successful human security campaigns have been characterised by the participation of a diverse group of actors including governments, NGOs, and citizens.

Foreign internal defence programs provide outside expert assistance to a threatened government. FID can involve both non-military and military aspects of counter-terrorism.

Another preventative action that has been used is the threat of and use of pork and pork products against radical religious groups that feel that contact with pork will render them unclean. The bodies of killed terrorists are daubed with lard and buried wrapped in pigskin.

Military Intervention

Terrorism has often been used to justify military intervention in countries where terrorists are said to be based. That was the main stated justification for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. It was also a stated justification for the second Russian invasion of Chechnya.

History has shown that military intervention is not *always* been successful in stopping or preventing terrorism. Although military action can disrupt a terrorist group's operations temporarily, it doesn't always end the threat.

Thus repression by the military in itself (particularly if it is not accompanied by other measures) usually leads to short term victories, but can be, in some cases, unsuccessful in the long run (e.g. the French's doctrine described in Roger Trinquier's book *Modern War* used in Indochina and Algeria). However, new methods (see the new *Counterinsurgency* Field Manual) such as those taken in Iraq have yet to be seen as beneficial or ineffectual.